















Abstract -  This paper explores the interface between two important institutional pillars of market exchange 
– Intellectual Property (IP) law and Antitrust law – in light of a theory of property rights incompleteness. 
This theory interprets property as an incomplete bundle of both defined and undefined rights over actual 
and potential uses of given resources and defines externalities as joint claims over rival production uses of 
undefined entitlements, irrespective of whether the object of property rights has a tangible or intangible 
nature. The paper argues that traditional distinctions between physical property and IP based on attributes of 
tangibility, rivalry and excludability are misleading and bases on the substantial homogeneity of property 
rights and IPRs an argument supporting the complementarity between IP law and Antitrust law. Far from 
being an unjustified ex-post limitation to existing property rights, likely to undermine ex-ante incentives, 
Antitrust intervention represents one of the means by which incompletely specified property rights (both 
intellectual and tangible) might be redefined over time as externalities emerge.  
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I.  Introduction 
 
Rights in information resources have long been analogized to private property rights. This is 
for various reasons, including the intuitive appeal of the analogy. In the past few years, 
however, the strong parallels traced between real property and intellectual property have 
taken more the flavor of rhetoric than of thoughtful insight. The “rhetoric of property” may 
come in various forms, but tends to boil down to a few strongly held convictions. First of all, 
there is the notion that what intellectual property should be all about is the internalization of 
externalities: the production of information is plagued by free-riding, which drives a wedge 
between the social value of information and its privately appropriable value and therefore 
undermines incentives. The more such free-riding is curbed, the more intellectual property 
rights will achieve their purpose. Second, and strongly related, is the “Blackstonian” 
conviction that (intellectual) property rights should be interpreted as absolute rights – the 
“sole and despotic dominion” of the right-holder (W. Blackstone, 1766) – in that fuller 
control over resources directly translates into improved exploitation of such resources. This, 
in turn, goes hand in hand with the emphasis placed on the restrictive notion of property as a 
right to exclude.  
The dissemination of this sort of convictions is apparent in the intellectual property 
realm. In the past few decades, IP law and IP-related court decisions have displayed a 
remarkable tendency towards increased standards of protection, extension of the proper 
subject matter of IP rights, extension of the terms of protection, increased likelihood for 
infringement claims to be upheld in court. To some extent, antitrust enforcement cannot be 
said to be immune from the “rhetoric of property” either. Some have dubbed the rise of ideas 
along the lines briefly recalled above as the rise of “appropriability arguments” in the antitrust 
discourse (R. Brunell, 2001). The concern with appropriability derives from a more general 
preoccupation for dynamic efficiency. Promotion of dynamic efficiency, in turn, is seen as 
inevitably intertwined to the provision of sufficient incentives to innovate. What is troubling 
about this approach is that it implies what we think is an undesirable corollary for antitrust 
decision-makers: antitrust intervention, for instance in the form of an obligation to provide 
competitors access to an IP-based essential facility, constitutes an undesirable ex-post 




dynamic efficiency) and therefore optimal policy calls for strict self-imposed limits to antitrust 
enforcement. In a sense, one might say that the now almost ubiquitous acknowledgement of 
the complementarity between IP law and antitrust law is, according to this view, interpreted 
to mean that both IP and antitrust should follow the same property logic. 
In this paper, we aim to cast doubt on the appropriateness of the notion of 
(intellectual) property that is driving much legislation, jurisprudence and scholarly comment 
in both the IP and the antitrust domain. Our starting point is the conceptualization of 
property as an incomplete bundle of both defined and undefined rights over actual and potential uses of given 
resources. According to this view of property – that we expose more fully elsewhere (see A. 
Nicita et al., 2005) – property, be it of tangibles or of intangibles, is inherently undefined. 
Within any property bundle can be identified a core and a periphery. While the core comprises 
well-defined uses over which clear right-duty jural relationships (W.N. Hohfeld, 1913; 
Commons, 1924) are defined, the periphery groups undefined uses for which the right-duty 
relationship is turned into one of power-liability. Controversies in the form of rival claims 
over undefined uses may thus well arise (we term them reciprocal negative externalities) so 
that one might recognize the existence of an inverse relationship between the degree of 
completeness of property and the emergence of externalities. In such a framework, a 
continuous process of property redefinition implemented through a variety of means, 
including antitrust enforcement, becomes indispensable. This holds particularly for 
intellectual property rights, given the relatively higher degree of incompleteness that they tend 
to display.  
Shifting the focus from the “right to exclude”-centered conceptualization of property 
to the “incompleteness”-centered view of property allows us to make two basic claims that 
stand in contrast with the ever-increasing propertization of both intellectual property and 
antitrust. The first claim is that the conceptual analogy between IP and real property should 
be interpreted to mean that the first should not be entitled to any special deference as 
compared to the latter. Thus, although we share with most commentators the analogy 
between IP and traditional property, we stress that this analogy implies that, just as we do not 
and should not consider conventional property as absolute, we should not do so for 
intellectual property.  
The second claim is that antitrust intervention constitutes a legitimate means through 
which the ex-post redefinition of inherently undefined rights might take place. This entails, in 
turn, that there should be no a priory reason for antitrust authorities to refrain from IP Law and Antitrust Law Complementarity: When Property Rights are Incomplete 
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intervening in IP-related matters. In a world of incomplete IPRs, IP law and Antitrust Law 
are complementary in that they both define and protect rights so as to solve externalities 
arising from the intrinsic incompleteness of property bundles, to encourage efficiency-
enhancing investments and to facilitate the efficient allocation of IPRs. While IP Law is 
aimed at solving problems of inefficient inclusion, Antitrust law intervenes to eliminate 
inefficient exclusion. IP Law aims at solving the ex-ante problem of free-riding, by inhibiting 
inefficient inclusion which would lead to a tragedy of commons. Using our terminology, it 
could be said that IP law is primarily concerned with the definition of the core of the property 
bundle. Antitrust Law intervenes to solve ex-post problems of inefficient exclusion due to the 
mere existence of protection to IP. Again, using our terminology, the domain of antitrust 
intervention is primarily, though not always of course, the periphery of the property bundle. In 
a world of incomplete property rights, externalities abound and the definition of ‘absolute 
rights’ would powerfully increase ex-ante incentives to invest by owners, but may inhibit ex-
post Pareto-efficient improvements. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 explores the “right-of-exclusion”-
centered or “Blackstonian” view of (intellectual) property that is increasingly pervading both 
the intellectual property and the antitrust discourse. Section 3 sets out a concise exposition of 
our conceptualization of property as an incomplete bundle of both defined and undefined rights over 
actual and potential uses of given resources. Section 4 explores the relationship between competition 
policy and both conventional and intellectual property rights from the special perspective of 
the essential facilities doctrine. Section 5 derives the main implications of our theory for the 
analogy between intellectual property and conventional property in tangibles and, more 
generally, for the determination of the appropriate intersection between intellectual property 
law and antitrust law. Section 6 concludes.  
 
II. “Right-to-exclude”-centered views of property and antitrust 
 
The conceptual analogy between real property and intellectual property has now become 
largely part of conventional wisdom. Perhaps the most thorough intellectual roots of the 
analogy can be traced to the works of Demsetz (1967) and Kitch (1977). The first explicitly 
referred to copyright and patents as examples of his more general theory on property 




closely analogous to those which arise in the land ownership example” (Demsetz, 1967, 
p.369). The second based his “prospect theory” of patents on the analogy between 
intellectual property rights and mineral claims, highlighting the incentive effect that 
possession of broad claims over ideas and their future applications exerts on right-holders 
just as it is the case for holders of rights over mineral resources.  
  The subsequent history of the analogy has been particularly fortunate. As mentioned, 
it has tickled the fancy of scholars’, judges’ and decision-makers’ minds. Acknowledged US 
authorities such as judge Easterbrook and judge Rich currently employ the IP-property 
equality assumption (F.H. Easterbrook, 1990). Recognition of strong parallels between 
conventional property and intellectual property features prominently both in the US 
DOJ/FTC Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Property, published in 1995, 
and in the 2004 European Commission Regulation on technology transfer agreements with 
the accompanying EC Guidelines. Moreover, many scholars propose the IP-property analogy 
as the basis for the drafting or reform of IP legislation (K.W. Dam, 1995, R. Epstein, 2003, 
T.I. Hardy, 1996, F.S. Kieff, 2001).  
What it is important to note is that, with the passing of time, the IP-property analogy 
has become strictly intertwined with one particular view of property, which we may define as 
“Blackstonian” in nature. In other words, the view of property implicitly presupposed by 
most of those who equate IP to conventional property focuses on the “right to exclude” as 
the qualifying attribute of property and emphasizes the incentive effect that follows from 
ownership intended as “the sole and despotic dominion” over resources (1766). This view of 
property calls for the greatest possible degree of control over resources by right-holders and 
regards property as “absolute” to a large extent. Thus, according to this conceptualization of 
property, the fact that the rules that apply to real property should also be applied to 
intellectual property means that in both domains the primary policy objective should be the 
greatest possible degree of internalization of externalities.  
This particular view of property combines insights from the work of early legal 
scholars such as Blackstone and the legal theorists of the French Revolution
1 with the 
utilitarian foundations of economic analysis and has thus proved particularly appealing to 
most economists.  Interestingly enough, legal scholars in both common law and civil law 
systems have rapidly come to recognize the unworkability of this notion of property, and 
                                                 
1 For thoughtful insights on the evolution of the notion of property in both common law and civil law countries 
see the contributions by Mattei (1999; 200???). IP Law and Antitrust Law Complementarity: When Property Rights are Incomplete 
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have for a long time struggled with the need to define the internal limits to the institution of 
property, those limits that arise from the interdependencies among human actions or, in other 
words, from the fact that society does not amount to an aggregation of monads
2. Economists, 
however, have sticked to an old legal notion of property that better suits utilitarian reasoning, 
largely ignoring subsequent refinements in legal thinking.  
The only relevant distinction usually traced by proponents of the IP-property analogy 
is based on the attribute of tangibility. Intellectual property differs from real property because 
of the characteristics of non-rivalry and non-excludability of the objects of IP entitlements. 
Taking these attributes into account does not, however, modify the very substance of 
property rights. Just as with conventional property in tangibles – the argument goes – 
protection of intellectual property rights is needed to impede unauthorized and 
uncompensated appropriation of properties and thus to ensure a sufficient amount of 
investment by right-holders (see, for instance F.H. Easterbrook, 1990, T.I. Hardy, 1996, 
F.S. Kieff, 2001, E.W. Kitch, 2002). To be sure, in this perspective, the attribute of 
intangibility even reinforces the rationale for granting owners absolute control over resources. 
In this regard, however, it should be noted that basing the distinction between intellectual 
property and property on tangibles on the non-excludable and non-rival nature of the object 
of property is no longer, and perhaps has never been, an appropriate approach. This is, on 
one side, because of the increased extent of technological control over the uses of intangibles, 
which is slowly eroding once clear-cut boundaries between excludable and non-excludable 
objects. On the other side, and most importantly, there is the fact that although information 
can be jointly used by as many as care making use of it without being depleted, some uses of 
information are necessarily rival from the point of view of its possessor (information may be, 
for instance, used to produce innovations competing in a downstream market). More 
generally, knowing that intangibility undermines appropriability and therefore incentives is an 
entirely different thing from knowing exactly what degree of appropriability should be 
ensured to restore appropriate incentives. Economists have long debated on this issue in the 
IP field, but no generally applicable conclusion can be drawn yet from their analyses. This 
                                                 
2 There are significant differences, in this regard, across the two sides of the Atlantic. As the famous judge 
Learned Hand has written, the American colonists of the seventeenth century established “a notion of society as 
an aggregation of monads” (cited in Ghidini, 2005; p.?) that implied a notion of property freed of any significant 
social duties. In civil law countries, by contrast, the social costraint imposed on the notion of property are easier 
to detect. Nevertheless, it still holds true that doctrines such as easements, adverse possession, nuisance, 
servitudes and imminent necessity, just to cite a few, acknowledge the need for American property law to deal 




means, in other words, that there is no economically sound basis for stating that IP rights 
should grant absolute control to right-holders.  
It might be argued that the “right-to-exclude”-centered notion of property that we 
have briefly described is at the origin of many policy developments in the IP domain. No 
controversy exists on the fact that in the past few decades intellectual property has 
significantly expanded along many dimensions (see, e.g. N.T. Gallini, 2002, W.M. Landes and 
R.A. Posner, 2004). Terms of protection have been lengthened in most industrialized 
countries through the harmonization process initiated by the TRIPs Agreement. The scope of 
patentable subject matter has expanded in the US as a consequence of a series of landmark 
Court decisions and elsewhere mainly through the legislative process. Most importantly, the 
likelihood that IP-related claims be upheld in court has significantly increased.  
Conceptual developments similar to those we have described in the IP realm can be 
identified in the antitrust realm, and especially at the intersection between the two. As it has 
been recently argued (R. Brunell, 2001), the “appropriability logic” is increasingly pervading 
the antitrust discourse. In other words, the economic logic behind absolutist views of 
intellectual property and property more generally now tends to shape antitrust policy as well, 
especially in the US. While a certain degree of tension with property rights policy has always 
characterized antitrust policy (R.J.R. Peritz, 2000), this tension seems at present more and 
more frequently resolved in favor of a prevalence of appropriability arguments within 
antitrust itself
3. This translates into an increasingly widespread tendency, by antitrust 
enforcers, to refrain as much as possible from intervening in IP-related matters, for fear of 
undermining appropriability and therefore incentives.  
Perhaps the best example of the trend we are presently considering concerns the issue 
of IP-related refusals to deal.  Most scholars and decision-makers are particularly sensitive to 
antitrust intervention in connection to refusal to deal cases primarily because it touches 
directly upon IP owners’ right to exclude. The same can be said of the subset of refusal to 
deal cases that involves the application of the “essential facilities” doctrine. In the United 
States, to our knowledge no case has so far involved a piece of intellectual property expressly 
identified as an essential facility and therefore subjected to licensing on reasonable and non-
discriminatory terms (see, for instance H.J. Hovenkamp et al., 2005). In Europe, some 
notable cases have envisaged the application of the essential facilities doctrine to IP assets, 
                                                 
3 Brunell (2001) lists several aspects of antitrust enforcement whereby this statement holds true.  IP Law and Antitrust Law Complementarity: When Property Rights are Incomplete 
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but it has been convincingly argued that “under current legal standards, refusal to 
deal/essential facilities cases involving intellectual property are subject to a higher legal 
standard than non-IP cases”, namely that, in other words, both the European Commission 
and the Courts ultimately tend to demonstrate special deference to IP with respect to tangible 
property (G. Ghidini, 2005; C. Ritter, 2005). We will come back on this issue in paragraph 4. 
The success of the equation between conventional property and IP described above 
does not imply that its implications have never been put into question. Some authors have 
questioned the analogy itself. Others have focused the attention on the fact that, while the 
kind of externalities relevant for the economic analysis of tangible property are mostly 
negative externalities, those relevant for the analysis of intellectual property should be only 
positive externalities (M.A. Lemley, 2004, F. Leveque and Y. Ménière, 2004). Mark Lemley 
(2004), for instance, remarks that the IP/tangible property analogy has generally led 
commentators to apply to the IP domain the same insights offered by the “parable of the 
commons” in connection to tangibles and that this leads to an excessive preoccupation with 
free-riding, at the expense of a more accurate evaluation of the balancing of incentives
4.  
In the following section, we propose a conceptualization of property that allows both 
to cast new light on the IP/tangible property analogy and to contrast the tendency to turn IP 
entitlements into absolute rights on grounds different from the assumption that information 
goods originate only positive externalities. This view will not refute the IP/real property 
analogy per se, but rather the sort of implications that have so far been drawn from the 
analogy and particularly from the “right to exclude”-centered view of property briefly recalled 
above.  
 
III.  The pervasive incompleteness of property
5 
The notion of property is surely crucial to economic analysis, yet it cannot be said that an 
agreed-upon concept exists
6. In most analyses, property is described as a fully defined object 
                                                 
4 Other critiques of the trend we are presently considering rest on different grounds. See, for 
instance, Litman (1999), Lunney (1999) and Radin (2003).  
5 This section draws heavily on a companion paper that constitutes an initial attempt to formulate a theory 
of incomplete property (A. Nicita, M. Rizzolli and M.A. Rossi, 2005).  
6 The notion of ownership in economics is a rather elusive one (D.W. Bromley, 1988, 1991, G.D. Libecap, 
2004a, 2004b, A. Ryan, 1998) and no universally accepted definition of the concept exists . In spite of its 




whose primary characteristics is that of securing full control over assets and resources, which 
in turn guarantees stability of expectations and alignment of incentives. When full control 
cannot be guaranteed, property is doomed to fail as an efficiency enhancing institution (D.C. 
North, 1992). Incompleteness, which is generally seldom mentioned in the context of 
property, is almost always considered from an ex-post perspective and mostly relates to issues 
of enforcement or weak partitioning of rights, as in the analysis of common pool resources 
(G.D. Libecap, 2004a, D. Lueck and T.J. Miceli, 2005, N. Schulz et al., 2002). In the literature 
one can find also some references to the imperfect knowledgeability of the content of 
property. Demsetz (1988, pg. 188), for instance, points out that the notion of “full private 
ownership” over assets is “vague ”, and that “[i]n one sense, it must always remain so, for 
there is an infinity of potential rights of actions that can be owned […]. It is impossible to 
describe the complete set of rights that are potentially ownable”( p. 19). The theory of 
property developed by Barzel (1989) and others also touches upon the idea that, as assets 
have multiple attributes many of which may not be specified, the very notion of ownership 
may remain vague. These insights, though, have gone largely unnoticed (Nicita, Rizzolli, 
Rossi, 2005). In our view, acknowledgement of the consequences of recognizing the intrinsic 
incompleteness of ownership is still far from sight.  
A.   The notion of Complete Property 
The notion of “complete” property might be exemplified by the definition of (complete) 
property rights provided by Shavell (2004) as rights “to use things and to prevent others from using 
them”. According to this view, someone’s right is always coupled with a duty on all other 
members of the society not to interfere with the individual’s exercise of his right. 
Consequently, “a particular possessory right is a right to commit a particular act or a right to prevent others 
from committing a particular act.” In Shavell’s terms, “a completely specified act includes in its description 
the place, time, and the contingency under which it is committed – for example digging at a designated location, 
on Thursday at 4:00 p.m. if it is not raining (the contingency)”. 
The bundle of rights Shavell seems to have in mind specifies all the relevant attributes 
of each use and the contingencies that characterize them. There is no incompleteness in the 
definition of the use of the assets at stake. The definition of property is complete since it 
includes all the relevant attributes necessary to exercise the rights and to be sure that none in 
                                                                                                                                                   
often functional to the specific analytic purpose at hand. Moreover, there is some terminological confusion, as 
some scholars often use the terms ownership, property and property rights interchangeably, while others define 
ownership (or property) as a set of specific rights each attached to the vast array of uses accessible by the owner. IP Law and Antitrust Law Complementarity: When Property Rights are Incomplete 
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society interferes (and in the case it does, that appropriate remedies are envisaged). This 
notion of “complete property” closely resembles the idea of complete markets in the Arrow-
Debreu-McKenzie paradigm (K.J. Arrow and D. Gerard, 1955, L.W. McKenzie, 1981). As for 
any other economic good, property is defined in terms of all its attributes regarding space, 
time and contingencies; ownership provides exclusive access to all these uses under all 
possible circumstances; a well-defined right is associated to each of these uses and thus a 
corresponding duty is defined for each right. There is no empty core or missing property right in 
such a system. Rather, there is a sort of general equilibrium among legal positions
7 both at the 
level of the bundle of rights (owners/nonowners) and at the level of each specific use 
embedded in ownership (rights/duties). The considerable amount of information concerning 
all the net of jural relations can be achieved, under this view, at little if no cost. In other 
words, the ex-ante transaction costs of defining all the uses bundled in property are assumed 
to be zero. 
This view of property as a complete bundle can be stylized as follows: let us assume 
that Ω=Δ∪Δ', where Δ= X,Y {} , is the set of all actual and potential uses or actions over 
which a system of private rights is defined in t=0 in a society made of just two individuals A 
and B.  Δ' is the set of uses complementary to Δ, with Δ'= Ω/ Δ { }. In such a context, 
X =Δ/ Y {} = x1,x2,x3,...,xn {}  is the bundle or well-defined rights held by A and 
Y =Δ/ X {} = y1,y2,y3,...,yn {}  is the bundle of well-defined rights under B’s control. Since 
rights are well defined, the partition of Δ = X,Y { } is such that all the uses known in t=0 are 
exclusively assigned, so that A has a duty not to interfere with Y and B has the duty not to 
interfere with X. Thus we have the following definition. 
Definition 1 : (Ex-Ante) Complete Property 
If Δ'=∅ and  X ∩Y = ∅ property rights are complete. 
 
This definition depicts an ideal and static situation in which all uses are divided and grouped 
in different adjacent bundles. However we can also imagine that new uses emerge over time 
and still property remains complete. If we suppose, for instance, that the use z emerges in 
t=1, and that rights over z are effortlessly absorbed by some existing bundles then we have 
Definition 2: (Ex-Post) Complete Property 
                                                 




If in t=1 Δ= X,Y,z {}  with  either  X =Δ/ Y,z { },  Y =Δ/ X { },  Δ'= ∅ and  X ∩Y =∅ or 
X =Δ/ Y {} , Y =Δ/ X,z {} , Δ'=∅ and  X ∩Y = ∅, then property will be completed ex-post.  
 
That is to say that, as soon as a new right is defined over z, it is assigned (by mean of an 
auction, a lottery, a court intervention etc.) either to A, with  X = x1,x2,x3,...,xn,z { }, or to B, 
with Y = y1,y2,y3,...,yn,z {} , and a specular duty not to interfere is also assigned to the non-
owner. One of the two bundles acquires the new use and no externality occurs since 
X ∩Y =∅ still holds ex-post. 
 
B.  Presumptive rights and externalities 
As mentioned at the beginning of this section, this ideal-type situation poorly describes the 
dynamics of the emergence and attribution of new undefined uses.  In fact, some time usually 
elapses between the emergence of a use and its inclusion in somebody’s bundle. While this 
use is still up for grab different situations may occur.  
Let us assume that in t=1, the new uses z and w emerge, respectively, from A’s access to X 
and B’s access to Y, so that Δ'= z,w {} . 
Definition 3 : Presumptive Rights 
If,  X =Δ/ Y {} ∪z,  Y =Δ/ X {} ∪w, and { } { } ∅ = ∪ ∩ ∪ w Y z X , then z and w are 
defined as  presumptive rights respectively of A and B. 
 
These new uses are accessible through the two preexisting bundles, however, in t=1, they are 
not covered by a socially enforced system of rights, thus  z,w} { ∉ Δ. If A’s access to the use z 
does not interfere with B’s access to w, and vice-versa, a presumptive right is a de facto right as 
long as society does not define to which bundle, if any, z and w belong. However as long as 
no one interferes with the exercise of these new uses, presumptive rights are treated as if they 
were socially recognized rights.  
When rival claims over these uses emerge, the conflict must be sorted out  
Definition 4: Externality IP Law and Antitrust Law Complementarity: When Property Rights are Incomplete 
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If, under the above setting,  X =Δ/ Y { }∪z and Y =Δ/ X {} ∪w, but 
X ∪z {} ∩ Y ∪w {} = z,w {} , then presumptive rights generate an externality. 
C.   Incomplete property as a bundle of core and peripheral rights 
As seen so far, incomplete property is a bundle of defined and presumptive rights, with the 
latter potentially exposed to an externality. Ex-ante defined rights constitute the core of the 
bundle of rights socially enforced by organized consent at any given time. Such rights imply 
mirror duties not to interfere from other members of society. This means that the core of the 
ownership bundle is made up of jural right-duty Hohfeldian (1913) relations. Violations of 
the rights belonging to the core constitute a taking. However, as seen in definition 2, by 
acceding to a property, new uses over which no clear right-duty relationship has been defined 
ex-ante may emerge. If owners of neighboring uses appropriate them they become 
presumptive rights, as we have defined them, or privileges (liberties), as in the Hohfeld-
Commons paradigm.  They do not initially belong to the core, even if they could be treated as 
de facto rights as long as no other agent exercises a rival presumptive right, privilege or liberty 
over the use, thus generating an externality. Presumptive rights are peripheral rights in the 
sense that no clear or definitive right-duty relationship over the use has been defined and an 
externality may emerge. As soon as the conflict of attribution is sorted out (for instance by a 
court), the presumptive right belonging to the periphery is turned into a right belonging to 
the core.  
Definition 5 – Incomplete Property 
A’s property ΔA = X ∪Z {}  is defined as a bundle of both (a) defined rights (the core X) 
and (b) presumptive rights (the periphery Z), where Z = z1,z2,z3,... { }.  
Note that Z ⊆Δ ', since by assumption no element of Z is already covered by an ex-ante 
defined right belonging to Δ.  A similar notation could be derived for the bundle ΔB of 
B. 
Definition 4bis: Externality with Incomplete Property 
When ΔA ∩ΔB = Z ⊆ Z, at least some of the presumptive rights in Z result to be ex-post 
rival uses between A and B and they will generate an externality. 




What it is important to note is that the framework of property incompleteness casts new light 
on the relationship between externalities and property: in fact there seems to be an inverse 
relationship between the degree of completeness of property rights and the emergence of 
externalities. More then that, externalities are the other side of the property coin since 
standing incompleteness of the latter generates the former, and continuous redefinition of 
property contributes to the internalization of externalities. In other words, it is the emergence 
of externalities that gives rise to opportunities for courts to improve the definition of any 
given property bundle. The decision to “protect” a given property bundle through the 
application of either a property or a liability rule has the effect of determining the very 
content of it at any given point of time, as was first hinted at by Coleman and Kraus’ (1986) 
seminal contribution.   
In our view, the incompleteness of property is pervasive and persistent in the sense 
that while conflicts over externalities are continuously resolved by courts, regulation and 
other means, new uses of given resources keep on being discovered and rival claims over 
presumptive rights create room for new conflicts to arise. In this cycle of continuous re-
definition, it might happen that the definition of the bundle catches-up with all uses known at 
a given point in time (and thus we have complete property), however this result is little else 
than an instable and temporary definition doomed to be plagued by incompleteness, as soon 
as new uses emerge. 
Thus, at any given point of time, the degree of incompleteness and the dimension of 
the core crucially depend on the extent to which rival uses are included in it, i.e. are covered 
by a right/duty relation. This, in turn, depends both on the ex-ante transaction costs in 
defining uses and rights over them in a clear and socially agreed fashion and on the ex-post 
activity of courts. What is important for our present purposes is that the degree of 
incompleteness, which can be thought of in terms of the defined-uses to undefined-uses ratio, 
varies across different property regimes, different institutional settings and according to the 
attributes of the assets. This implies that, while our conceptualization of property entails an 
analogy between property and IP, it nevertheless traces a distinction between the two based 
on the degree of incompleteness, rather than on the degree of tangibility. The practical 
importance of this difference with what we have called the right-to-exclude-based views of 
property will be apparent in what follows. Here it is sufficient to suggest the simple intuition 
that the higher degree of incompleteness characterizing IP might call for an enhanced role of IP Law and Antitrust Law Complementarity: When Property Rights are Incomplete 
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courts and legislatures in dealing with it, rather than for the non-interventionist approach 
called for by proponents of the tangibility-based distinction between property and IP.   
  As a final note, it is worth saying that, as we briefly mentioned in the introduction, the 
conception of property that we propose in this and the companion paper should sound as 
“old wine in new bottles” to law scholars who, in the past two centuries, have come to 
acknowledge the difficulties incurred in treating property as “absolute” for the purposes of 
applied legal reasoning (Mattei, 1999, 200??).   
IV.  Competition policy and property rights: a brief outline from the 
perspective of the essential facility doctrine  
 
Competition policy is generally deemed a legal instrument aimed at enhancing consumers’ 
welfare by safeguarding the ‘institution of competition’
8. In both the US and the EU 
competition laws, antitrust enforcement prevents competitors from conspiring to fix price or 
to restrain trade and individual firms from dominating  markets. This action is extended also 
to mergers and other forms of horizontal property concentration that may create or enhance 
single or joint dominant positions in relevant markets. Since ‘property rights are central to the 
operation of any economy’, the way in which antitrust law deals with ownership and property 
rights is central to understanding how the institution of competition affects and is affected by 
property institutions. Not surprisingly, then, the way in which competition law approaches 
property rights has strictly paralleled the fundamental rhetorics that, from time to time, have 
accompanied antitrust action (R.J.R. Peritz, 2000). 
One apt way to analyze how competition law deals with property rights is to look at 
the evolution of the so-called essential facility doctrine (EFD).  The general principle of the EFD 
is the following: “the owner of a properly defined “essential facility” has a duty to share it 
with others, and […] a refusal to do so violates article 2 of the Sherman Act” (H. 
Hovenkamp, 1999 p. 273). The essential facility doctrine is thus intended to deal with a 
particular form of refusal to deal strategy enacted by a dominant firm, denoted as ‘bottleneck 
monopolist’, to exclude competitors from the market not only by refusing to deal but also by 
imposing conditions (such as pricing, tying and so on) which in fact constitute an insuperable 
barrier to entry for competitors.  
                                                 




We may say, according to the Calabresi and Melamed (1972) framework, that the 
application of the essential facility doctrine in fact affects the way in which some of the 
proprietary assets possessed by a dominant firm are protected. When essential facilities are at 
stake, competitors have the right to access essential facilities even without the consent of the 
owner, provided an appropriate compensation is granted. Thus, assets identified as essential 
facilities are protected by a liability rule rather than by a property rule. The implementation of 
the EFD basically raises two main questions: (i) how to define the qualifying features of an 
essential facility; (ii) how to balance mandatory access to an essential facility with the efficient 
alignment of private incentives to invest and to innovate by dominant firms
9.  
Of course, the crucial problem here is that the above questions are very difficult to 
assess and consequently there is a very high risk for an antitrust authority to take wrong 
decisions with the effect of increasing competition distortion rather than improving 
consumers’ welfare (R. Pitofsky et al., 2002). 
 
A.   The special liability of dominant firms 
In both US and EU antitrust, dominant firms are charged with a ‘special 
responsibility’ pursuant to which they have the duty not to adopt decisions which may – 
directly or indirectly  - affect the ‘normal’ competitive structure of the market in which the 
dominant position is held, or in markets which maintain a functional relationship with the 
dominant firm (such as downstream or derivative markets). There is a presumptive right, 
generally accorded to firms, to refuse to deal with competitors, but “such a right is not 
absolute; it exists only if there are legitimate competitive reasons for the refusal”
10. The 
European Court of First Instance (CFI) declared that “under article [82] refusal to supply, 
even where it is total, is prohibited only if it constitutes an abuse”
11. Thus CFI recognizes 
“the importance of safe-guarding free enterprise when applying the competition rules”
12.  A 
refusal to supply oil to occasional customers, for instance, has been evaluated by the 
European Court of Justice as reasonable, due to the shortage imposed by the 1973 OPEC oil 
boycott
13. However, a corollary of the above principle is that the dominant firm that refuses 
                                                 
9 That is the problem related with liability rules once the ‘ex-ante view of the Cathedral’ is taken into account 
by Bebchuk (2001). 
10 Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 483 n.32 (1992). 
11 Case T-41/96 Bayer A.G. v. Commission, Judgement 26 October 2000. 
12 Ibidem. 
13 Case 77/77, BP v. Commission (1978) ECR 1513, (1978) 3 CLMR 174. IP Law and Antitrust Law Complementarity: When Property Rights are Incomplete 
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to supply has the obligation to provide an objective justification for that. The two main 
principles emerging from the US approach are the following: “a monopolist does not have a 
general obligation to cooperate with rivals; but […] some refusals  to deal may have 
“evidentiary significance” and may produce liability in certain decisions” (Hovenkamp, 1994, 
p. 264). The first is also known as the Colgate
14 principle and contains the corollary that the 
decision of refusing to deal should not, in any respect, be compatible with any purpose to 
create or maintain a monopoly.  
 
B.   The principles outlined in US and EU jurisprudence 
In the US
15, the first case explicitly involving essential facilities is United States v. Terminal 
Railroad Association
16. Other important cases were Associated Press
17, Lorain
18, Otter Tail Power
19, 
Aspen skiing
20. The Seventh Circuit attempted to define the conditions for the application of 
the essential facility doctrine in MCI
21 in the following way: (1) the essential facility is 
controlled by a monopolist; (2) there is a competitor’s inability practically or reasonably to 
duplicate the essential facility; (3) the denial of the use of the facility to a competitor; and (4) 
the feasibility of providing the facility to competitors. A similar approach has been followed 
by the European Commission.  
                                                 
14 United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 US, 300, 307, 39 S. Ct. 465, 468 (1919). 
15 See also (A. Nicita and A. Castaldo, 2005)  
16 United States v. Terminal Railroad Railroad Association, 224 US, 383 (1912). The refusal to provide access to 
an ‘essential facility’ was not a case of abuse of dominant position, rather a case of a concerted collective 
boycott. In that case, the Court considered an association by a group of railroads controlling all the bridges and 
connections from and towards St. Louis as an illegal restraint of trade and as an attempt to monopolize against 
competing railroad services. 
17 Associated Press v. United States, 326 US 1 (1945). The limitation by an association to provide its copyrighted 
news service only to its members was interpreted as an anticompetitive refusal to deal. 
18 Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, 342 US, 143, 146-49, 156 (1951). A local dominant newspaper, which 
was the only collector of advertisement in newspapers, refused to accept advertising from firms, which were also 
placing advertisement in radio station. 
19 Otter Tail Power Co, v. United States, 410 US 366, 93 S. Ct 1022 (1073). The Supreme Court condemned the 
refusal by a public utility to distribute power for municipal utilities companies who were also acquiring power 
from other alternative sources. 
20 Aspen skiing 472 US. The refusal to agree with a competitor on continuing to provide customers with a 
comprehensive ticket that would have induced the right incentive to ski also in the competitor’s skiing plants has 
been deemed as anticompetitive without recurring to the essential facility doctrine, even if some scholars agreed 
on considering access to the integrated ticket an essential facility. 
21  MCI Communications v. At&T Co., 708 F.2d 1081, 1132-33 (7th Cir. 1983). A monopolist 
telecommunications provider was forced to provide access to its local service network to competitors in long-




The principal European cases involving an essential facility argument are: 
Telemarketing
22, Commercial Solvents
23,  British Midland/Aer Lingus
24,  Sealink/B&IHolihead
25,  Sea 
Containers ltd/Stena Sealink
26, Port of Rodby
27, Port of Roscoff
28, Magill






In Commercial solvents there is also the first statement of the Commission involving the 
epithet ‘essential facility’: “a dominant undertaking which both owns or controls and itself 
uses an essential facility, i.e. a facility or infrastructure without access to which competitors 
cannot provide services to their customers, and which refuses its competitors access to that 
facility or grants access to competitors only on terms less favourable than those which it gives 
its own services, thereby placing the competitors at a competitive disadvantage, infringes 
Article [82]”. In particular, the Commission added that in cases in which the competitor is 
already subject to a certain level of disruption from the dominant undertaking's activities 
“there is a duty on the dominant undertaking not to take any action which will result in 
further disruption.  That is so even if the latter’s action make, or are primarily intended to 
make, its operations more efficient.” 




36; of those cases, the first and the last directly involve intellectual property. In Magill
37, 
                                                 
22 Case 311/84 Centre Belge d’Etudes du Marché-Telemarketing v. Compagnie Luxembourgeoise de Telediffusion Sa and 
Information Publicité Benelux Sa (1985) ECR 3261, (1986) 2 CMLR 558. The Luxembourg television stopped to 
accept advertisement for telemarketing unless the phone number used was that of its own subsidiary. 
23 Cases 6, 7/73 Istituto Chemioterapico Italiano Spa and Commercial Solvents  Corp. v. Commission (1974) ECR 223, 
(1974) 1 CMLR 309. A firm (CSC) supplying aminobutanol, through its Italian subsidiary to a company Zoja 
which used that as raw material to obtain ethambutol, further used as a basic component of pharmaceutical 
products. For a while Zoja, finding cheaper supplier, suspended its orders. When Zoja decided to turn back to 
its original supplier, CSC opposed a refusal to deal, having decided to supply only an upgraded product, from 
which it was possible to obtain ethambutol as its Italian subsidiary did, in direct competition with Zoja. The 
Commission and the Court of Justice declared that this behaviour was an abuse of dominant position. 
24 [1992] OJ L96/34.  
25 [1992] 5 CMLR 255 
26 [1994] OJ L15/8 
27 [1994] OJ L55/52 
28 [1995] 5 CMLR 177 
29 RTE&ITP v. Commission [1995] ECR I-743 
30 European Night Services v. Commission [1998] ECRII-3141 
31 Case C-7/97 Oscar Bronner GMBH & CO. KG V. Mediaprint [1998] ECR I-7791 
32 GVG/FS (COMP/37.685 - Antitrust) [2003] ECComm 64 (27 August 2003) 
33 NDC Health/IMS Health: Interim measures (COMP D3/38.044 - Antitrust) [2003] ECComm 61 (13 
August 2003) 
34 For an analytical comment on the Magill decision see Anderman (1998). 
35 Case C-7/97 Oscar Bronner GMBH & CO. KG V. Mediaprint [1998] ECR I-7791 
36 NDC Health/IMS Health: Interim measures (COMP D3/38.044 - Antitrust) [2003] ECComm 61 (13 
August 2003) 
37 For an analytical comment on the Magill decision see Anderman (1998). IP Law and Antitrust Law Complementarity: When Property Rights are Incomplete 
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the European Court of Justice held that the refusal by television stations to grant Magill 
access to their programme schedules constituted a misuse of market power since it both 
prevented the emergence of a new product and it blocked access to a secondary market. The 
Court ruled that television broadcasters had abused their dominant position on the market 
for their television programme listings by invoking their copyright over such listings in order 
to prevent third parties from publishing complete weekly guides to the programmes of the 
various broadcasters. The copyright-protected listings were indispensable raw material for 
compiling a weekly television guide as it was in Magill’s intentions. The Court ruled that 
preventing the creation of a new product, a comprehensive weekly guide to television 
programmes, for which there was a potential consumer market was abusive. 
In Oscar Bronner
38 the European Court of Justice argued that mandatory access can be 
required, and enforced, only “where access to a facility is a precondition for competition on a 
related market for goods or services for which there is a limited degree of interchangeability” 
or “where duplication of the facility is impossible or extremely difficult owing to physical, 
geographical or legal constraints”. Thus, according to the Court, in order to investigate 
whether we are in presence of an essential facility, we should not focus solely on the market 
power of the owner of the facility in the upstream market, so as to conclude that the conduct 
of the facility owner of “reserving to itself the downstream market is automatically an abuse”.  
In IMS
39, the Court of First Instance concluded against the application of the  EFD 
by the European Commission and outlined three exceptional circumstances that must all be 
present for the enforcement of copyright to be an abuse of a dominant position: (i) a distinct 
market for a new product separate from the market for the copyright products of the 
copyright owners; (ii) no justification for the refusal to license, and (iii) the conduct of the 
copyright owners should produce the effect of reserving to themselves the secondary market. 
C.   Property rules, Liability rules and Rules of Reason in applying EFD 
                                                 
38 Mediaprint, a dominant publisher of newspapers in Austria, which established a nationwide system for 
newspapers home-delivery, refused to distribute also the newspaper published by Bronner, actually a newspaper 
with only local diffusion and minor audience. Mediaprint was actually distributing not only its own newspapers 
but also an independent newspaper for which however it was also providing the whole service of printing, 
distribution and home-delivery.  
39 The Commission found that the refusal by IMS to provide access to a particular copyrighted work (the 
"brick structure" of a regional sales data service in Germany) would have eliminated competition since, without 
that access, it was not possible for a competitor to enter the market. The Commission ordered interim measures 
requiring IMS to license its competitors, but that decision of the Commission was overruled by the European 




Several lessons could be drawn from the US and EU application of the essential 
facility doctrine (A. Nicita and A. Castaldo, 2005). 
First, the imposition of mandatory access to dominant firms’ assets does never result, 
either in the US or in the EU, from the application of a per se rule; rather, it results from 
consideration of specific and isolated circumstances under a rule of reason approach. The 
general rule to be followed is that competition policy preserves the integrity of property 
rights, which amounts to saying that firms’ assets should be generally protected through the 
application of property rules. This conclusion, in turn, is motivated by the rather 
uncontroversial assumption that property rules preserve owners’ incentives to invest and to 
enhance competitive dynamics. 
 Second, when compulsory access to an essential facility is enforced, property rights 
are in fact protected by a liability rule. Moreover, the protection of an asset that constitutes an 
essential facility through liability rules is allowed only under the circumstance that 
competitors’ access does not impair owners’ ability to serve final consumers or, in other 
words, that access is feasible and does not result in a regulatory taking. 
Third, intellectual property rights do not deserve, in this respect, any particular favor: when 
they identify an essential and not duplicable asset owned by a dominant firm eventually 
vertically integrated in the downstream market and when the access to it is necessary in order 
to start a new business or to create a new product for which there is an actual or potential 
demand, then the essential facility doctrine applies also to IPRs, as in Magill and IMS. 
The last point surely deserves some comment. Indeed, it should be remarked that some 
difference in approach exists between the EU and the US in regard to the application of the 
essential facilities doctrine to intellectual property assets. As mentioned in the second 
paragraph, although the allegation that intellectual property constitutes an essential facility has 
been made in some US antitrust cases (see, e.g., Intergraph Corp. vs. Intel Corp. and Aldridge v. 
Microsoft Corp.), we are not aware of any clear statement by a US Court identifying an 
intellectual property right itself with an essential facility. The previous discussion highlights 
that this has occurred, by contrast, in the EU in some notable cases. However, it might be 
argued that the “new product requirement” in IP-related cases points to the existence of a 
higher legal standard for compulsory licensing of IP than for compulsory access to tangible 
property (C. Ritter, 2005). Thus, while IPRs are not in principle exempted from the IP Law and Antitrust Law Complementarity: When Property Rights are Incomplete 
 
19
application of the essential facilities doctrine in the US and in the EU, in practice more 
caution seems to be applied in IP-related essential facilities cases than in non-IP-related cases.  
 
V. Understanding the complementarity between IP law and Antitrust 
Law 
IP-related essential facilities cases have raised more than one eyebrow among scholars and 
practitioners. Indeed, most commentators in Europe tend to interpret very narrowly both the 
scope of application and the implications of the IMS and Magill cases. Similarly, in the US, the 
view that intellectual property rights themselves should not constitute an essential facility is 
widespread (see, e.g., H.J. Hovenkamp, M.D. Janis and M.A. Lemley, 2005). The two primary 
concerns generally raised in this connection are the following. First, the application of the 
essential facilities doctrine to IP assets and antitrust intervention more generally affects the 
very essence of intellectual property rights, namely the right to exclude, and can be considered 
akin to a regulatory taking. Second, given these premises, antitrust undermines appropriability 
of innovations and therefore the incentives needed to stimulate the creation of intangible 
resources. The corollary of these two concerns is that antitrust should refrain from interfering 
with IP rights as much as possible. In other words, the complementarity between IP law and 
antitrust law is interpreted to mean, in this perspective, that they should both follow the same 
property logic.  
In this section, we submit that the incompleteness-centered notion of (intellectual) 
property introduced in the third paragraph allows us to cast doubt on the appropriateness of 
these concerns and to reach very different conclusions.  Let us start from considering the first 
concern, namely that antitrust intervention should be equated to a regulatory taking.  The 
theory of incomplete property suggests that this would be the case in a world in which 
property was a complete bundle of rights over well-defined uses coupled with a system of 
socially enforced duties upon non-owners not to interfere. In such a world, any modification 
of existing bundles constitutes a taking and is susceptible to undermine the very substance of 
the property-control nexus. In a world of incomplete property, by contrast, some of the 
presumptive rights belonging to the periphery of the property bundle are exposed to the 
emergence of negative externalities (as we have defined them in section 3) and antitrust law 
constitutes a legitimate means through which redefinition of inherently incomplete 




circumstances. In one case, that may be well exemplified by the IMS and Magill cases 
mentioned above, an externality emerges involving a new use of the intellectual resource that 
constitutes the object of property. In this case, antitrust intervention serves the purpose of 
solving the externality by attributing the rights over the previously undefined use to one of 
the rival claimants. This process is unlikely to decrease ex-ante incentives, if anything because 
the uses over which rights become defined as a consequence of antitrust action were not 
previously known. An alternative case may occur independently of the existence of a new use 
for a given resource and involves the emergence of an externality in circumstances in which 
specific contingencies obtain. The dominance of the firm owning an essential facility is one of 
these contingencies. In this case, competition law specifies ex-ante that, under specific 
circumstances, the rights over some of the uses embedded in dominant firms’ property turn 
into presumptive rights at the periphery of the bundle. Competition law reshapes the boundaries 
of ownership by clearly identifying the contingencies that redefine property. For instance, it 
establishes under what circumstances the ‘special responsibility’ of dominant firms obliges 
them to abstain from exercising those rights bundled in property which may produce 
externalities, i.e. from exercising those presumptive rights on uses which turn to be rival in 
some respect to non-owners. Of course, what is established ex-ante by competition law is ex-
post implemented through antitrust enforcement. 
To turn now to the second concern – that antitrust policy necessarily damages 
incentives if it intervenes in IP-related matters – consider the implications of our theory for a 
conceptualization of IP rights. The intrinsic incompleteness of (intellectual) property reflects 
the ex-ante transaction costs to be sustained to clearly define all the uses associated to the 
exercise of a given (intellectual) property right. Incompleteness is, however, not only the 
result of the objective impossibility to foresee ex-ante all the possible uses of given assets; in a 
sense, it also serves an efficiency purpose: it allows to economize on the ex-ante costs of 
rights definition by attributing right-holders the right to freely exercise all the uses bundled in 
her property as long as an externality over undefined uses does emerge. In other words, conceived of 
this way, intellectual property allows to incur some costs of definition only when (and if) an 
externality emerges and therefore to partially save on these costs. Thus, (intellectual) property 
confers to the owner a residual right to control bundled undefined uses. However this right is 
not to be considered absolute, as in the case of rights on well-defined uses; rather it is a 
presumptive right subject to the emergence of a potential conflict raised by rival claimants. What 
the owner can do with his (intellectual) property is only partially clear and well-defined at any IP Law and Antitrust Law Complementarity: When Property Rights are Incomplete 
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point of time. It also depends on the emergence of externalities and on the way in which 
controversies are solved. The scope of uses (defined and undefined) bundled in (intellectual) 
property is always greater than that delineable in a word of complete property rights.  
It is important to note that this implies at the same time that intellectual property is a 
powerful device for incentives alignment and that there should be no presumption on the 
optimality of conferring to the right-holder full control over all the uses bundled in property. 
When an externality emerges, a Demsetzian process of right re-definition through bundling 
and unbundling of rights is set in motion. As mentioned above, sometimes this process takes 
place through antitrust intervention. More precisely, antitrust law deals with those 
externalities that have the power to distort the mechanism of competition and to reduce 
consumer welfare.  
The previous observations cast an entirely new light on the widely held notion of the 
complementarity between IP law and antitrust policy. Far from implying that both 
instruments should concur to ensure the greatest possible degree of control over assets, and 
especially intangible assets, the perspective we introduce in this paper clearly carves out the 
respective roles of IP and antitrust. While the former is aimed at defining ex-ante the core of 
rights bundled in ownership that exclude non-owners from access, the latter is devoted to 
absorb ex-post externalities by (re)defining presumptive rights at the periphery of the 
property bundle that generate negative externalities. As mentioned, we think this 
interpretation applies equally to tangible and intangible property. In the case of intellectual 
property, however, it might be argued that antitrust intervention in the form of a redefinition 
of the property bundle should more frequently be called for because of the higher degree of 
incompleteness of IPRs as compared to physical properties. Thus, while the focus on the 
attribute of intangibility provides an argument against antitrust intervention in IP-related 
matters, the focus on the degree of incompleteness even reinforces the argument in support 
of an active role of antitrust in such matters. The key difference between the two perspectives 
relates to the fact that, while the standard argument in support of full control over 
information goods is related to the risk of appropriation of positive externalities by non owners 
(which is the risk of takings with respect to rights which belong to the core of the bundle), 
the argument here suggested is related to the risk of imposition of negative externalities by 
owners on non owners (which is the exercise of presumptive rights over rival uses belonging 




One aspect of the complementarity that it is important to stress is that the 
redefinition of IP that takes place through antitrust intervention has not only the above-
mentioned merit of allowing to save on some ex-ante costs of definition, but it may also have 
the merit of realizing a fine-tuning of incentives that cannot be realized ex-ante through IP 
legislation. IP law is, for the most part, not designed to be technology-specific. In other 
words, it does not reflect the characteristics of the underlying markets in which it is meant to 
provide incentives and thus can achieve a very limited degree of fine-tuning of incentives to 
specific conditions on the market. If one bears in mind that the objective of the multiple 
policies affecting innovation, including IP and antitrust, should not be to provide the 
maximum possible incentive, but just the incentives needed to ensure an optimal amount of 
innovative effort, it becomes apparent that there should be no self-imposed limitation to 
antitrust intervention in IP-related matters. Antitrust application of a rule of reason criterion, 
which generally implies a careful scrutiny of relevant markets, barriers to entry, dynamics of 
competition and consumers’ welfare may be considered a useful instrument to achieve the 
tailoring of incentives to the characteristics of given markets that IP is not able (and not 
meant) to achieve.  
As a final note, consider that the nature of the complementarity between IP and 
antitrust generally varies across different institutional settings. One important difference in 
this regard concerns the crafting of IP law. Some IP statutes recur relatively more intensely 
than others to liability rules in the protection of IP entitlements. This is the case, for instance, 
in the EU as compared to the US, especially if one considers the discipline governing 
improvements over existing inventions in patent law. In the US, the “blocking patent” rule 
constitutes an instance of the application of a property rule to the protection of IP 
entitlements. In the EU, as well as in many other countries around the world, the legal 
treatment of dependent inventions involves the protection of patent entitlements through 
liability rules if specific circumstances obtain (see art. 31 TRIPs). Though the details differ 
across national legislations, most European countries (among which Austria, Belgium, France, 
Italy and the UK) envisage the possibility of compulsory licensing of the original invention to 
the holder of rights over an improvement judged significant according to a relevant metric, 
clearly affecting the public interest and/or applicable in a field different from that of the 
original patent. The holder of the original patent is compensated by an amount that might be 
determined by the parties themselves or by courts and, sometimes, by the right to use the IP Law and Antitrust Law Complementarity: When Property Rights are Incomplete 
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improvement (see the World Intellectual Property Organization – Industrial Property Laws 
and Treaties).  
The opportunity for increasing the recourse to liability rules in the protection of IP 
entitlements is the object of an interesting current debate (I. Ayres, 2005, I. Ayres and P. 
Klemperer, 1999), but it is outside the scope of this paper. Here, we would only like to stress 
two points. The first is that both the application of liability rules in IP legislation and the 
application of liability rules through antitrust intervention have their own merits in that they 
both constitute legitimate means through which redefinition of inherently incomplete 
intellectual property rights takes place. The second is that the sparse references to US 
antitrust and IP law made in this paper suggest that, in the US, (intellectual) property tends 
more often than elsewhere to be completed by assuming that any presumptive right belongs 
to the core of the property bundle even if it gives rise to the emergence of externalities. If this 
is the case and, of course, if there is some merit to the views we present in this paper, it might 
be an opportune time for a substantial rethinking of the current notion of the 
complementarity between IP and antitrust in the US, as others have already suggested (see, 
e.g. R.J.R. Peritz, 2000). 
VI.   Conclusive Remarks 
Present-day economies depend crucially on the ability to deliver new products and 
technologies to the market. Both intellectual property laws and competition policy 
undoubtedly exert a deep effect on this ability. It has been historically less clear, however, 
how the interface between these two policy instruments should be crafted. Indeed, for a long 
time scholars and policy-makers have highlighted the existence of a tension between a policy 
whose primary goal is to stimulate innovation through the creation of legal monopolies and a 
policy aimed at promoting competition. This view has now been substantially refuted, and 
most would agree that IP law and antitrust law are in a complementary relationship.  
In this paper, we argue that the reconciliation between IP and antitrust as it has so far 
been interpreted by most commentators logically presupposes the acceptance of an analogy 
between IP and private property and a restrictive notion of property interpreted merely as the 
right to exclude from access to the object of property. This leads, in turn, to strict self-
imposed limits to antitrust intervention in IP-related matters and to interpret antitrust and IP 




property/appropriability logic.  The main aim of this paper is to cast doubt on this wisdom 
and to shed new light on the complementarity between IP and antitrust. Our starting point is 
a conceptualization of property as an inherently incomplete bundle of both defined and undefined 
rights over actual and potential uses of given resources, that we expose more fully elsewhere (A. Nicita, 
M. Rizzolli and M.A. Rossi, 2005). Interpreting property as an inherently incomplete bundle 
composed of a core of well-defined right-duty Hohfeldian jural relations and a periphery of 
presumptive rights to which do not correspond well-defined duties not to interfere leads us to 
carve out clear complementary roles for IP and antitrust. While the former is aimed at 
defining ex-ante the core of rights bundled in ownership that exclude non-owners from 
access, the latter is devoted to absorb ex-post externalities by (re)defining presumptive rights 
at the periphery of the property bundle that generate negative externalities. This view calls for 
a role of antitrust in redefining ex-post inherently incomplete rights that should involve 
equally tangible and intangible properties. The key distinction in this regard does not relate to 
the attribute of tangibility but rather to the degree of incompleteness of assets, so that IP 
should be seen as requiring more intense intervention of this sort relative to physical property 
if, as it seems to be the case, it enjoys a higher degree of incompleteness. Most importantly, 
following the perspective that we propose in this paper, antitrust intervention does not 
necessarily entail a reduction of ex-ante incentives to create intangible assets.   
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